From 5be87b2e736962dce2576012b7f1cf215f169f34 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jelmer Vernooij Date: Wed, 2 Apr 2008 17:03:02 +0200 Subject: Move unix-specific random_bytes() implementation to unix.c. --- lib/misc.c | 65 -------------------------------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 65 deletions(-) (limited to 'lib') diff --git a/lib/misc.c b/lib/misc.c index ccf208b5..1670b91d 100644 --- a/lib/misc.c +++ b/lib/misc.c @@ -391,71 +391,6 @@ signed int do_iconv( char *from_cs, char *to_cs, char *src, char *dst, size_t si return( outbuf - dst ); } -/* A pretty reliable random number generator. Tries to use the /dev/random - devices first, and falls back to the random number generator from libc - when it fails. Opens randomizer devices with O_NONBLOCK to make sure a - lack of entropy won't halt BitlBee. */ -void random_bytes( unsigned char *buf, int count ) -{ - static int use_dev = -1; - - /* Actually this probing code isn't really necessary, is it? */ - if( use_dev == -1 ) - { - if( access( "/dev/random", R_OK ) == 0 || access( "/dev/urandom", R_OK ) == 0 ) - use_dev = 1; - else - { - use_dev = 0; - srand( ( getpid() << 16 ) ^ time( NULL ) ); - } - } - - if( use_dev ) - { - int fd; - - /* At least on Linux, /dev/random can block if there's not - enough entropy. We really don't want that, so if it can't - give anything, use /dev/urandom instead. */ - if( ( fd = open( "/dev/random", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK ) ) >= 0 ) - if( read( fd, buf, count ) == count ) - { - close( fd ); - return; - } - close( fd ); - - /* urandom isn't supposed to block at all, but just to be - sure. If it blocks, we'll disable use_dev and use the libc - randomizer instead. */ - if( ( fd = open( "/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK ) ) >= 0 ) - if( read( fd, buf, count ) == count ) - { - close( fd ); - return; - } - close( fd ); - - /* If /dev/random blocks once, we'll still try to use it - again next time. If /dev/urandom also fails for some - reason, stick with libc during this session. */ - - use_dev = 0; - srand( ( getpid() << 16 ) ^ time( NULL ) ); - } - - if( !use_dev ) - { - int i; - - /* Possibly the LSB of rand() isn't very random on some - platforms. Seems okay on at least Linux and OSX though. */ - for( i = 0; i < count; i ++ ) - buf[i] = rand() & 0xff; - } -} - int is_bool( char *value ) { if( *value == 0 ) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 51bbec0b0e280be629f7b1086160b7730ebfdb74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jelmer Vernooij Date: Wed, 21 May 2008 12:27:28 +0200 Subject: Revert move of random_bytes() to unix.c --- lib/misc.c | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 65 insertions(+) (limited to 'lib') diff --git a/lib/misc.c b/lib/misc.c index 1670b91d..ccf208b5 100644 --- a/lib/misc.c +++ b/lib/misc.c @@ -391,6 +391,71 @@ signed int do_iconv( char *from_cs, char *to_cs, char *src, char *dst, size_t si return( outbuf - dst ); } +/* A pretty reliable random number generator. Tries to use the /dev/random + devices first, and falls back to the random number generator from libc + when it fails. Opens randomizer devices with O_NONBLOCK to make sure a + lack of entropy won't halt BitlBee. */ +void random_bytes( unsigned char *buf, int count ) +{ + static int use_dev = -1; + + /* Actually this probing code isn't really necessary, is it? */ + if( use_dev == -1 ) + { + if( access( "/dev/random", R_OK ) == 0 || access( "/dev/urandom", R_OK ) == 0 ) + use_dev = 1; + else + { + use_dev = 0; + srand( ( getpid() << 16 ) ^ time( NULL ) ); + } + } + + if( use_dev ) + { + int fd; + + /* At least on Linux, /dev/random can block if there's not + enough entropy. We really don't want that, so if it can't + give anything, use /dev/urandom instead. */ + if( ( fd = open( "/dev/random", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK ) ) >= 0 ) + if( read( fd, buf, count ) == count ) + { + close( fd ); + return; + } + close( fd ); + + /* urandom isn't supposed to block at all, but just to be + sure. If it blocks, we'll disable use_dev and use the libc + randomizer instead. */ + if( ( fd = open( "/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK ) ) >= 0 ) + if( read( fd, buf, count ) == count ) + { + close( fd ); + return; + } + close( fd ); + + /* If /dev/random blocks once, we'll still try to use it + again next time. If /dev/urandom also fails for some + reason, stick with libc during this session. */ + + use_dev = 0; + srand( ( getpid() << 16 ) ^ time( NULL ) ); + } + + if( !use_dev ) + { + int i; + + /* Possibly the LSB of rand() isn't very random on some + platforms. Seems okay on at least Linux and OSX though. */ + for( i = 0; i < count; i ++ ) + buf[i] = rand() & 0xff; + } +} + int is_bool( char *value ) { if( *value == 0 ) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7f49a8642e162611cf20ab95955098597d1f4472 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jelmer Vernooij Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2008 05:09:49 +0200 Subject: Move random_bytes() back to lib/ --- lib/misc.c | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 67 insertions(+) (limited to 'lib') diff --git a/lib/misc.c b/lib/misc.c index 1670b91d..0998b7e2 100644 --- a/lib/misc.c +++ b/lib/misc.c @@ -391,6 +391,73 @@ signed int do_iconv( char *from_cs, char *to_cs, char *src, char *dst, size_t si return( outbuf - dst ); } +/* A pretty reliable random number generator. Tries to use the /dev/random + devices first, and falls back to the random number generator from libc + when it fails. Opens randomizer devices with O_NONBLOCK to make sure a + lack of entropy won't halt BitlBee. */ +void random_bytes( unsigned char *buf, int count ) +{ +#ifndef _WIN32 + static int use_dev = -1; + + /* Actually this probing code isn't really necessary, is it? */ + if( use_dev == -1 ) + { + if( access( "/dev/random", R_OK ) == 0 || access( "/dev/urandom", R_OK ) == 0 ) + use_dev = 1; + else + { + use_dev = 0; + srand( ( getpid() << 16 ) ^ time( NULL ) ); + } + } + + if( use_dev ) + { + int fd; + + /* At least on Linux, /dev/random can block if there's not + enough entropy. We really don't want that, so if it can't + give anything, use /dev/urandom instead. */ + if( ( fd = open( "/dev/random", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK ) ) >= 0 ) + if( read( fd, buf, count ) == count ) + { + close( fd ); + return; + } + close( fd ); + + /* urandom isn't supposed to block at all, but just to be + sure. If it blocks, we'll disable use_dev and use the libc + randomizer instead. */ + if( ( fd = open( "/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK ) ) >= 0 ) + if( read( fd, buf, count ) == count ) + { + close( fd ); + return; + } + close( fd ); + + /* If /dev/random blocks once, we'll still try to use it + again next time. If /dev/urandom also fails for some + reason, stick with libc during this session. */ + + use_dev = 0; + srand( ( getpid() << 16 ) ^ time( NULL ) ); + } + + if( !use_dev ) +#endif + { + int i; + + /* Possibly the LSB of rand() isn't very random on some + platforms. Seems okay on at least Linux and OSX though. */ + for( i = 0; i < count; i ++ ) + buf[i] = rand() & 0xff; + } +} + int is_bool( char *value ) { if( *value == 0 ) -- cgit v1.2.3 From fde7b91536d2d0f5bc8e3e2226fba2188f038fb4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jelmer Vernooij Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2008 05:10:03 +0200 Subject: Implement ssl_pending() in bogus ssl backend. --- lib/ssl_bogus.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) (limited to 'lib') diff --git a/lib/ssl_bogus.c b/lib/ssl_bogus.c index 5bae3496..a07ea752 100644 --- a/lib/ssl_bogus.c +++ b/lib/ssl_bogus.c @@ -60,3 +60,8 @@ b_input_condition ssl_getdirection( void *conn ) { return GAIM_INPUT_READ; } + +int ssl_pending( void *conn ) +{ + return 0; +} -- cgit v1.2.3 From 21e5d4981de057bae5261720021757d893061652 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jelmer Vernooij Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2008 05:16:15 +0200 Subject: Move SSPI SSL implementation to same directory as other SSL backends. --- lib/ssl_sspi.c | 278 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 278 insertions(+) create mode 100644 lib/ssl_sspi.c (limited to 'lib') diff --git a/lib/ssl_sspi.c b/lib/ssl_sspi.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a16423b1 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/ssl_sspi.c @@ -0,0 +1,278 @@ + /********************************************************************\ + * BitlBee -- An IRC to other IM-networks gateway * + * * + * Copyright 2002-2004 Wilmer van der Gaast and others * + \********************************************************************/ + +/* SSL module - SSPI backend */ + +/* Copyright (C) 2005 Jelmer Vernooij */ + +/* + This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or + (at your option) any later version. + + This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + GNU General Public License for more details. + + You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License with + the Debian GNU/Linux distribution in /usr/share/common-licenses/GPL; + if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, + Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA +*/ + +#include "ssl_client.h" +#include +#define SECURITY_WIN32 +#include +#include +#include +#include "sock.h" + +static gboolean initialized = FALSE; +int ssl_errno; + +struct scd +{ + int fd; + ssl_input_function func; + gpointer data; + gboolean established; + CredHandle cred; /* SSL credentials */ + CtxtHandle context; /* SSL context */ + SecPkgContext_StreamSizes sizes; + + char *host; + + char *pending_raw_data; + gsize pending_raw_data_len; + char *pending_data; + gsize pending_data_len; +}; + +static void ssl_connected(gpointer, gint, GaimInputCondition); + +void sspi_global_init(void) +{ + /* FIXME */ +} + +void sspi_global_deinit(void) +{ + /* FIXME */ +} + +void *ssl_connect(char *host, int port, ssl_input_function func, gpointer data) +{ + struct scd *conn = g_new0(struct scd, 1); + + conn->fd = proxy_connect(host, port, ssl_connected, conn); + sock_make_nonblocking(conn->fd); + conn->func = func; + conn->data = data; + conn->host = g_strdup(host); + + if (conn->fd < 0) + { + g_free(conn); + return NULL; + } + + if (!initialized) + { + sspi_global_init(); + initialized = TRUE; + atexit(sspi_global_deinit); + } + + return conn; +} + +static void ssl_connected(gpointer _conn, gint fd, GaimInputCondition cond) +{ + struct scd *conn = _conn; + SCHANNEL_CRED ssl_cred; + TimeStamp timestamp; + SecBuffer ibuf[2],obuf[1]; + SecBufferDesc ibufs,obufs; + ULONG req = ISC_REQ_REPLAY_DETECT | ISC_REQ_SEQUENCE_DETECT | + ISC_REQ_CONFIDENTIALITY | ISC_REQ_USE_SESSION_KEY | + ISC_REQ_ALLOCATE_MEMORY | ISC_REQ_STREAM | ISC_REQ_EXTENDED_ERROR | + ISC_REQ_MANUAL_CRED_VALIDATION; + ULONG a; + gsize size = 0; + gchar *data = NULL; + + memset(&ssl_cred, 0, sizeof(SCHANNEL_CRED)); + ssl_cred.dwVersion = SCHANNEL_CRED_VERSION; + ssl_cred.grbitEnabledProtocols = SP_PROT_SSL3_CLIENT; + + SECURITY_STATUS st = AcquireCredentialsHandle(NULL, UNISP_NAME, SECPKG_CRED_OUTBOUND, NULL, &ssl_cred, NULL, NULL, &conn->cred, ×tamp); + + if (st != SEC_E_OK) { + conn->func(conn->data, NULL, cond); + return; + } + + do { + /* initialize buffers */ + ibuf[0].cbBuffer = size; ibuf[0].pvBuffer = data; + ibuf[1].cbBuffer = 0; ibuf[1].pvBuffer = NULL; + obuf[0].cbBuffer = 0; obuf[0].pvBuffer = NULL; + ibuf[0].BufferType = obuf[0].BufferType = SECBUFFER_TOKEN; + ibuf[1].BufferType = SECBUFFER_EMPTY; + + /* initialize buffer descriptors */ + ibufs.ulVersion = obufs.ulVersion = SECBUFFER_VERSION; + ibufs.cBuffers = 2; obufs.cBuffers = 1; + ibufs.pBuffers = ibuf; obufs.pBuffers = obuf; + + st = InitializeSecurityContext(&conn->cred, size?&conn->context:NULL, conn->host, req, 0, SECURITY_NETWORK_DREP, size?&ibufs:NULL, 0, &conn->context, &obufs, &a, ×tamp); + if (obuf[0].pvBuffer && obuf[0].cbBuffer) { + /* FIXME: Check return value */ + send(conn->fd, obuf[0].pvBuffer, obuf[0].cbBuffer, 0); + } + + switch (st) { + case SEC_I_INCOMPLETE_CREDENTIALS: + break; + case SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED: + break; + case SEC_E_INCOMPLETE_MESSAGE: + break; + case SEC_E_OK: + break; + } + + QueryContextAttributes(&conn->context, SECPKG_ATTR_STREAM_SIZES, &conn->sizes); + } while (1); + + conn->func(conn->data, conn, cond); +} + +int ssl_read(void *conn, char *retdata, int len) +{ + struct scd *scd = conn; + SecBufferDesc msg; + SecBuffer buf[4]; + int ret = -1, i; + char *data = g_malloc(scd->sizes.cbHeader + scd->sizes.cbMaximumMessage + scd->sizes.cbTrailer); + + /* FIXME: Try to read some data */ + + msg.ulVersion = SECBUFFER_VERSION; + msg.cBuffers = 4; + msg.pBuffers = buf; + + buf[0].BufferType = SECBUFFER_DATA; + buf[0].cbBuffer = len; + buf[0].pvBuffer = data; + + buf[1].BufferType = SECBUFFER_EMPTY; + buf[2].BufferType = SECBUFFER_EMPTY; + buf[3].BufferType = SECBUFFER_EMPTY; + + SECURITY_STATUS st = DecryptMessage(&scd->context, &msg, 0, NULL); + + if (st != SEC_E_OK) { + /* FIXME */ + return -1; + } + + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { + if (buf[i].BufferType == SECBUFFER_DATA) { + memcpy(retdata, buf[i].pvBuffer, len); + ret = len; + } + } + + g_free(data); + return -1; +} + +int ssl_write(void *conn, const char *userdata, int len) +{ + struct scd *scd = conn; + SecBuffer buf[4]; + SecBufferDesc msg; + char *data; + int ret; + + msg.ulVersion = SECBUFFER_VERSION; + msg.cBuffers = 4; + msg.pBuffers = buf; + + data = g_malloc(scd->sizes.cbHeader + scd->sizes.cbMaximumMessage + scd->sizes.cbTrailer); + memcpy(data + scd->sizes.cbHeader, userdata, len); + + buf[0].BufferType = SECBUFFER_STREAM_HEADER; + buf[0].cbBuffer = scd->sizes.cbHeader; + buf[0].pvBuffer = data; + + buf[1].BufferType = SECBUFFER_DATA; + buf[1].cbBuffer = len; + buf[1].pvBuffer = data + scd->sizes.cbHeader; + + buf[2].BufferType = SECBUFFER_STREAM_TRAILER; + buf[2].cbBuffer = scd->sizes.cbTrailer; + buf[2].pvBuffer = data + scd->sizes.cbHeader + len; + buf[3].BufferType = SECBUFFER_EMPTY; + + SECURITY_STATUS st = EncryptMessage(&scd->context, 0, &msg, 0); + + ret = send(scd->fd, data, + buf[0].cbBuffer + buf[1].cbBuffer + buf[2].cbBuffer, 0); + + g_free(data); + + return ret; +} + +void ssl_disconnect(void *conn) +{ + struct scd *scd = conn; + + SecBufferDesc msg; + SecBuffer buf; + DWORD dw; + + dw = SCHANNEL_SHUTDOWN; + buf.cbBuffer = sizeof(dw); + buf.BufferType = SECBUFFER_TOKEN; + buf.pvBuffer = &dw; + + msg.ulVersion = SECBUFFER_VERSION; + msg.cBuffers = 1; + msg.pBuffers = &buf; + + SECURITY_STATUS st = ApplyControlToken(&scd->context, &msg); + + if (st != SEC_E_OK) { + /* FIXME */ + } + + /* FIXME: call InitializeSecurityContext(Schannel), passing + * in empty buffers*/ + + DeleteSecurityContext(&scd->context); + + FreeCredentialsHandle(&scd->cred); + + closesocket(scd->fd); + g_free(scd->host); + g_free(scd); +} + +int ssl_getfd(void *conn) +{ + return ((struct scd*)conn)->fd; +} + +GaimInputCondition ssl_getdirection( void *conn ) +{ + return GAIM_INPUT_WRITE; /* FIXME: or GAIM_INPUT_READ */ +} -- cgit v1.2.3 From 424e66361e985d05e47a7af42e81cd32b09dd6e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wilmer van der Gaast Date: Sun, 22 Jun 2008 10:32:46 +0100 Subject: Partial fix for #419: Moved normalize() and some other stuff to OSCAR becuase it's the only place where it's used, and using this to strip spaces from all screennames before sending them to BitlBee. --- lib/misc.c | 25 ------------------------- lib/misc.h | 1 - 2 files changed, 26 deletions(-) (limited to 'lib') diff --git a/lib/misc.c b/lib/misc.c index ccf208b5..1ecb5181 100644 --- a/lib/misc.c +++ b/lib/misc.c @@ -61,31 +61,6 @@ void strip_linefeed(gchar *text) g_free(text2); } -char *normalize(const char *s) -{ - static char buf[BUF_LEN]; - char *t, *u; - int x = 0; - - g_return_val_if_fail((s != NULL), NULL); - - u = t = g_strdup(s); - - strcpy(t, s); - g_strdown(t); - - while (*t && (x < BUF_LEN - 1)) { - if (*t != ' ') { - buf[x] = *t; - x++; - } - t++; - } - buf[x] = '\0'; - g_free(u); - return buf; -} - time_t get_time(int year, int month, int day, int hour, int min, int sec) { struct tm tm; diff --git a/lib/misc.h b/lib/misc.h index a2acada6..5376cd22 100644 --- a/lib/misc.h +++ b/lib/misc.h @@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ struct ns_srv_reply G_MODULE_EXPORT void strip_linefeed( gchar *text ); G_MODULE_EXPORT char *add_cr( char *text ); G_MODULE_EXPORT char *strip_newlines(char *source); -G_MODULE_EXPORT char *normalize( const char *s ); G_MODULE_EXPORT time_t get_time( int year, int month, int day, int hour, int min, int sec ); double gettime( void ); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 6a78c0eed44820a2fefe1e96516e335eddc9c70b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wilmer van der Gaast Date: Mon, 30 Jun 2008 16:37:12 +0100 Subject: Silenced a compiler warning - I don't think there's any way the unitialized version of ret could actually be returned. --- lib/misc.c | 8 ++------ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'lib') diff --git a/lib/misc.c b/lib/misc.c index c087f6a5..9d504b75 100644 --- a/lib/misc.c +++ b/lib/misc.c @@ -583,13 +583,9 @@ int md5_verify_password( char *password, char *hash ) md5_byte_t *pass_dec = NULL; md5_byte_t pass_md5[16]; md5_state_t md5_state; - int ret, i; + int ret = -1, i; - if( base64_decode( hash, &pass_dec ) != 21 ) - { - ret = -1; - } - else + if( base64_decode( hash, &pass_dec ) == 21 ) { md5_init( &md5_state ); md5_append( &md5_state, (md5_byte_t*) password, strlen( password ) ); -- cgit v1.2.3